






Briefing: Low-income voters, the 
2019 General Election and the future 
of British politics 
 
 
This report looks at the effect of low-income voters on the 2019 UK General 
Election, and how their motivations and concerns affected their choices. It 
explains Labour’s defeat, the Conservative breakthrough in many 
traditional Labour areas, and what this reveals about British politics. Key to 
understanding this are the people struggling to stay afloat on lower than 
average incomes. Current economic and societal impacts of COVID-19 mean 
all political parties need to keep the focus of debate on this pivotal group, 
many of whom are at risk of being swept into poverty. 
 
Matthew Goodwin, University of Kent 
Oliver Heath, Royal Holloway University of London 
Key points and recommendations   
• Low-income workers, central to driving recent political change, potentially face a 
double injustice. They were less able to isolate themselves at home and are now 
most exposed to the worst economic effects of the COVID-19 crisis. Left 
unaddressed this differential experience could have profound political effects. 
• The Conservatives are now more popular with people on low incomes than high 
incomes. Labour is as popular with the wealthy as with those on low incomes.  
• Labour urgently need to revive their offer, particularly in light of the effect COVID-
19 is having on low-income voters. They should reconnect with these voters not 
only through economic policies, but also by tapping into concerns about Britain’s 
place in the world, immigration, law-and-order and rapid social change.  
• The Conservative call to ‘level-up’ the nation and redistribute resources away 
from London to the regions, combined with support for Brexit, won many 
traditional Labour voters; but they’ll need to work hard to retain that support.  
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Executive summary 
• Britain’s two main parties – the Conservatives and Labour – are undergoing a 
process of change prompted by a series of electoral upsets starting in 2016. The 
Conservative Party under Theresa May and now Boris Johnson has signalled its 
desire to embrace low-income, ‘left behind’ workers who were traditionally 
Labour-leaning. Labour under Sir Keir Starmer is trying to find its way to a 
workable accommodation between a set of diverse voting blocs that can propel it 
back to power. Neither can succeed without consulting the evidence. 
• This report draws on new data to explore these debates. Focusing on the general 
election of 2019, we show how the electorates of the two main parties have 
changed in profound ways. Low-income voters, who have been central to driving 
recent political change, played a central role in putting the Conservatives into 
power and Labour into opposition. 
• While Labour enjoyed a lead among low-income voters as recently as 2017, this 
has disappeared. Despite being in office for nearly a decade, in 2019 the 
Conservatives established a 15-point lead over Labour among people on low 
incomes. It is the first time in recorded history that the Conservative Party has 
outpolled Labour among people on low incomes.  
• Most of the Conservative Party’s new votes from low-income voters came direct 
from Labour. In 2019, Labour lost nearly one in three low-income voters who had 
turned out to vote for the party in 2017. By contrast the Conservatives retained 
90% of low-income voters who voted for them in 2017.  
• Remarkably, the Conservatives are now more popular among people on low 
incomes than they are among people on high incomes. The Conservatives are no 
longer the party of the rich, while Labour is no longer the party of the poor. The 
Labour Party that Sir Keir Starmer recently became leader of is today just as 
popular among the wealthy as it is among those on low incomes. Both parties 
have inverted their traditional support base. 
• In conclusion, while the Conservatives will need to work hard to retain support 
from these low-income voters, Labour urgently needs to revive its offer – 
especially given tentative evidence that it is low-income voters who, unjustly, will 
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Introduction: low-income voters in British politics 
The 2019 General Election took place against the backdrop of the vote for Brexit and a 
prolonged period of gridlock over the issue in parliament. The election produced the 
largest Conservative majority since 1987, the largest majority for any party since 2001, 
and the largest share of the vote for the Conservatives since 1979. Boris Johnson and 
his party enjoyed sweeping gains in many Labour heartlands, areas that had provided 
majority support for Brexit just three years earlier.1 For some within the Conservative 
Party, the result was a vindication of their decision to appeal far more strongly to low-
income or ‘left behind’ workers. 
 
While the Conservatives were returned to power, Labour was left to reflect on a 
historic defeat. Four months later, in April 2020, Jeremy Corbyn was replaced as leader 
of the Labour Party by Sir Keir Starmer, the former Shadow Secretary of State for 
Exiting the European Union. Starmer won the leadership contest after securing 56% of 
the vote in the first round. He promised to rebuild his party’s relationship with voters 
and find a way back to power. 
 
Both of these events point to how British politics is changing in important ways. They 
raise some big and profound questions. What might account for Labour’s historic 
defeat? How was the Conservative Party able to break through in many traditional 
Labour areas? What led so many people in these more working class and low-wage 
seats to switch from the Labour Party to the Conservatives? And what does all of this 
reveal about British politics more generally? 
 
This report shows that key to answering these questions are people who struggle to 
get by on lower than average incomes. Ever since Britain voted for Brexit in 2016, the 
authors have worked with JRF to show, in a series of reports, how low-income voters 
have been absolutely central to driving political change in modern Britain.  
 
In the aftermath of the referendum in 2016, we showed how it was the poorest 
households, and people who are vulnerable to poverty, who were the most likely to 
vote for Brexit. Then, in 2017, we showed how many of these voters were ‘cross-
pressured’ by their competing concerns over economic issues like jobs and inequality, 
and cultural issues like Brexit and immigration. While Labour retained a slight lead over 
the Conservatives among this group, neither party made a decisive breakthrough; 
Labour enjoyed its strongest support among low-income voters since the heyday of 
Tony Blair but the Conservatives enjoyed their strongest support among this group 
since the era of Margaret Thatcher.  
 
Meanwhile, we showed how low-income voters in Scotland did not hold cohesive 
preferences about Brexit and the independence of Scotland, and why there were good 
reasons for all of the parties, including the Scottish National Party, to revisit their 
appeal to this group.   
 
Then, in the most comprehensive report to date on low-income voters in Britain, we 
brought all of this work together to show how, between 1987 and 2017, low-income 
voters have become more ‘up-for-grabs’ than ever before; they have become more 
likely to switch their vote at elections, less loyal to one party, and more likely to 
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engage with politics. Labour, we argued, needed to refresh its offer to these voters if it 
was to prevent further loss of support. The Conservatives, meanwhile, needed to 
revive their offer to these voters in order to continue their recent gains. 
 
This report brings the story up-to-date and shows how, at the 2019 general election, 
these longer-term trends collided to deliver a comprehensive victory for the 
Conservative Party and a bruising defeat for Labour. Section 1 puts the 2019 general 
election in context, exploring the evolution of British politics. Section 2 turns to 
examine aggregate-level support for Labour and the Conservatives, with a focus on 
voting behaviour in low-wage seats. Section 3 draws on new individual-level data to 
investigate how people who live on low incomes voted at the 2019 General Election 
and how this compares with past elections. Section 4 examines the relationship 
between poverty, income and place. In Section 5 we present our key messages and 
reflect on how all the main parties might retain or revive support among people on low 
incomes and/or those who are at risk of poverty. 
 
1 Background: toward the 2019 General Election  
The 2019 General Election arrived after a decade of political turbulence. It bookended 
a decade that started with the fall-out from a global financial crisis and ended with a 
fierce debate about Britain’s relationship with the European Union and its place in the 
world. In between, there arrived a succession of shocks: the rise of Nigel Farage and 
the populist and pro-Brexit UK Independence Party; the rise to dominance of the SNP 
in Scotland; the rise of Jeremy Corbyn; an unexpected majority for David Cameron’s 
Conservative Party in 2015; the vote for Brexit a year later; a widely unexpected hung 
parliament in 2017; and the return of populism, with Farage and the Brexit Party 
finishing in first place at the 2019 European elections.2 
 
These events reflected the arrival of much higher rates of volatility in British politics. 
Between 2010 and 2017, nearly half of all voters switched their votes from one party 
to another.3 This played a key role in producing a degree of fragmentation in Britain’s 
party system that is largely without precedent in the post-war era. Shortly before the 
2019 General Election, the two main parties, Labour and Conservative, had polled just 
46% of the vote combined. This ‘squeeze’ reflected the rise of challengers, including 
the Brexit Party and Liberal Democrats, which at one point held more than 40% of the 
national vote between them.4  
 
Linked closely to this volatility was widespread public dissatisfaction with the parties, 
politicians and how Westminster was seen to be managing the most important issue of 
the day: Brexit. As the 2019 General Election neared, no less than 72% of voters felt 
dissatisfied with the Government, 68% felt dissatisfied with Corbyn, 56% felt 
dissatisfied with Johnson, 56% felt dissatisfied with Farage, and 51% felt dissatisfied 
with the leader of the Liberal Democrats, Jo Swinson. Meanwhile, just 18% felt that the 
Government was managing Brexit ‘well’ while 75% felt that it was being handled 
‘badly’. Perceptions about the state of the economy were also negative. When voters 
were asked shortly before the election whether they expected the economy to get 
better or worse, 50% expected the economy to deteriorate and only 21% expected it 
to improve. While most voters felt dissatisfied with politics a large number were also 
convinced that the economy was deteriorating.5 
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This was the immediate backdrop to the 2019 General Election, which was finally 
called after MPs failed to pass a Brexit deal and Prime Minister Boris Johnson had been 
unable command sufficient support for the timetable of his proposed Withdrawal 
Agreement Bill. Brexit, unsurprisingly, dominated the campaign, though it was not the 
only issue.  
 
Boris Johnson and the Conservative Party combined their primary call to ‘Get Brexit 
Done’ with more traditional messages on social issues and a different economic 
response to that which had been offered by David Cameron and George Osborne a 
decade earlier.  
 
Seeking to consolidate and extend their recent gains among working-class voters and 
people on low-incomes, which we have documented in previous reports, the 
Conservatives devoted more attention to addressing economically struggling 
communities. They offered a combination of both cultural and economic messages, 
combining promises to deliver Brexit, a new immigration system and a tougher stance 
on crime, with new commitments to invest heavily in infrastructure, the NHS and 
tackling regional inequality. The new focus on appealing to voters in areas that had 
been marginalised relative to London and the south-east was reflected in a specific 
commitment to ‘listen to people who have felt left behind by the last few decades of 
economic growth and want to have more control of their future’. The UK Shared 
Prosperity Fund, The Towns Fund, £100 billion in additional infrastructure spending 
and greater investment in bus networks and railways were designed to appeal to 
lower-wage ‘left behind’ communities. So too were promises to increase the National 
Living Wage, lift the National Insurance threshold, end the benefit freeze and continue 
Universal Credit, although the manifesto only mentioned ‘poverty’ on one occasion.  
 
Labour, in contrast, combined promises to renegotiate Boris Johnson’s Brexit deal and 
put it to a second referendum with the largest programme of wealth distribution and 
public sector investment seen in British politics. This included increased taxes for high 
earners and corporations, the nationalisation of key industries, big spending increases 
in public services, and a national transformation fund to pay for long-term 
infrastructure and spending. Labour also devoted attention to low-income voters and 
included more references to poverty in its manifesto, including the commitment to 
‘end foodbank Britain, and lift children and pensioners out of poverty’. Labour 
promised to extend workers’ rights, launch a green industrial revolution, introduce 
free school meals for all primary school children, scrap Universal Credit, build 100,000 
council homes, eradicate in-work poverty and introduce a Real Living Wage. 
 
During the campaign, the Conservative Party led in every poll and in the final week 
averaged an almost 10-point lead over Labour. Crucially, three key factors worked in 
its favour and these were around Brexit, social class and public perceptions.  
 
First, the decision taken by Conservatives to appeal directly to Brexit voters reaped 
dividends. Between the arrival of Boris Johnson as the new Conservative Party leader 
and Prime Minister in July 2019 and the final week of the general election campaign in 
December 2019, the percentage of people who had voted for Brexit in 2016 and who 
now planned to vote Conservative at the election surged from 34% to 71%.6 In 
contrast, the Remain vote was more fragmented. Over the same period the 
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percentage of people who had voted Remain in 2016 and now planned to vote Labour 
only increased from 27% to 48%. In other words, if the 2019 General Election marked a 
‘Brexit election’ then only one Brexit side appeared to be mobilising accordingly. 
 
Second, throughout the 2019 General Election campaign the Conservatives established 
significant leads over Labour among the working classes and low-income voters, both 
of whom had turned out in larger numbers for Brexit. By the final week of the 
campaign the Conservatives held a striking 17-point lead over Labour among the C2DE 
social grades. This suggested that the Conservatives were continuing a process that 
had been underway since 2017, with the party advancing most strongly among 
working class voters, pensioners and non-graduates while losing ground in areas that 
contained larger numbers of young voters, graduates and people from minority ethnic 
groups.7 
 
Third, Labour appeared to suffer more than the Conservatives from negative public 
perceptions. Jeremy Corbyn’s leadership ratings were weaker than they had been in 
2017; 76% of voters felt dissatisfied with how Corbyn was doing his job, leaving the 
Labour leader with the worst ‘net satisfaction’ ratings of any opposition leader since 
modern polling began in the 1970s.8 Large majorities of voters felt that Labour’s 
position on Brexit was ‘unclear’, did not trust Corbyn to run the economy, felt that a 
Labour government would push Britain into recession and that Labour’s big spending 
promises would require tax increases. These further undermined Labour’s campaign. 
 
2 The 2019 General Election results: aggregate-level  
When all the votes had been counted the 2019 General Election delivered the 
Conservative Party its largest majority since 1987. Johnson and his party attracted 44% 
of the vote, their largest vote share since 1979, when Margaret Thatcher came to 
power. This meant that the Conservatives had increased their share of the national 
vote at every general election since 2001.  
 
The result was especially striking given that the Conservative Party had been in power 
for nearly a decade. Despite his party having been in power through the fallout of the 
Great Recession, austerity and a divisive national debate over Brexit, Boris Johnson still 
became the third consecutive Conservative Prime Minister. Unless there is a snap 
election in the years to come, his party’s uninterrupted period in office could now run 
to at least 15 years. 
 
For Labour, in sharp contrast, the general election delivered a major defeat. The 
opposition party was reduced to 203 seats, a loss of 59 on the election just two years 
earlier and its lowest number of seats since 1935. The party attracted just 32% of the 
vote. Compared with 2017, the party’s support in England fell back by 8 percentage 
points which means that Labour has still not beaten the Conservatives in England since 
2001. Support also fell back nearly 9 points in Scotland, 8 points in Wales, 13 points in 
the North East, 10 points in Yorkshire, 9 points in the Midlands, and 6 points in London 
and southern England. 
 
What explains the Conservative victory and what does it tell us about British politics? 
Before drilling into individual-level data we first consider three issues at the aggregate 
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level: the role of Brexit, income, and social class. In terms of Brexit, the Conservative 
Party was clearly helped by geography. As the political scientist Chris Hanretty pointed 
out before the general election, at the 2016 referendum the Leave side had won more 
than 60% of general election seats. This meant that at the 2019 General Election Leave 
voters were spread more evenly across England and Wales, and so a campaign that 
focused heavily on mobilising Leave voters had a crucial, inbuilt advantage. Remain, in 
contrast, was more strongly concentrated in cities and the university towns.  
 
This advantage was reflected in the results. Of the 401 seats that were estimated to 
have voted Leave in 2016, the Conservatives won 73% (292 seats). Of the 50 seats that 
recorded the sharpest increases in public support for the Conservatives all but one had 
voted Leave in 2016. These gains did not come from nowhere.  
 
Two years earlier, in 2017, Prime Minister May and the Conservative Party had won 
only six pro-Leave seats from Labour but they had also whittled down Labour 
majorities. Two years later, this made it easier for Boris Johnson and the Conservatives 
to break through; of the 54 seats that Conservatives took from Labour, 50 had voted to 
leave the EU.  
 
Labour might have been able to compete with this had support for Remain been as 
consolidated as that for Leave. But it was not; Labour only won 41% of the 231 seats 
that were estimated to have voted Remain – 95 seats. Labour not only faced 
competition from the SNP and Liberal Democrats in these seats but also Conservatives, 
who managed to retain nearly one in three seats that are estimated to have voted 
Remain in 2016.  
 
Given that working-class voters, people on low incomes and citizens with few 
educational qualifications were more likely than average to have voted to leave the 
EU, Brexit also helped Conservatives make serious inroads in seats that had large 
numbers of these voters. Most notably, it helped Boris Johnson and his party capture 
large parts of Labour’s ‘red wall’; a band of northern, working-class and low-wage seats 
that runs from the Vale of Clwyd in north Wales to Great Grimsby in Humberside.  
 
It was in these more working-class and usually more northern seats, which tend to 
have lower than average wages, where Labour recorded its sharpest losses. Of the 50 
seats that recorded the sharpest declines of support for Labour more than half (29) 
were in the North East, North West or Yorkshire. Many of the seats that switched from 
red to blue had been represented by Labour for generations – seats like Great Grimsby 
(Labour since 1945), Bishop Auckland (1935), Bassetlaw (1935), Wakefield (1932), 
Leigh (1922) and Don Valley (1922). 
 
This pointed to deeper shifts in the nature of support for Britain’s two main parties. 
Conservatives emerged from the 2019 General Election with a much stronger hold in 
seats that contain larger than average numbers of working-class voters, people 
without degrees and those who struggle on lower than average wages. Compared with 
2017, the Conservative Party enjoyed some of its strongest gains in these ‘low-wage’ 
seats. 
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The ONS publishes data on the median earnings in each seat based on the Annual 
Survey of Hours and Earnings. Using earnings data from 2019, we examine how 
constituency-level party support varies by average earnings, and how this has changed 
since 2010 (in England and Wales). Figure 1 shows the ‘line of best fit’ between 
average earnings in a constituency in 2019 and a party’s vote share. Historically, 
Labour always tended to perform much better in constituencies with low average 
earnings than in constituencies with high average earnings. In contrast, the 
Conservatives tended to do much better in well-off areas than places with low 
earnings. However, in 2019 the Conservatives advanced much more strongly into these 
low-wage areas, and were more popular than Labour. Whether we define these 
constituencies in terms of earnings, class or educational qualifications, a similar picture 
emerges. The Conservatives made great strides in places which historically voted 
Labour. This points to the realignment of British politics and important changes in the 
nature of support for both parties that we will explore further. 
 
The Conservative Party’s growing presence in seats where average wages were lower 
than the regional and national average is reflected in its capture of seats like Blackpool 
South, Vale of Clwyd, Great Grimsby, Stoke-on-Trent North, Hyndburn, Redcar, 
Ashfield and Wolverhampton North East, all of which suffer from low median wages. 
But for the Conservatives these gains did not come without consequences; appealing 
to voters in low-wage seats also came at the expense of support in high-wage areas 
where people turned in greater numbers to the Liberal Democrats.  
 
Figure 1: Median constituency wage and party support, 2010–2019 (England and 
Wales) 
 
Source: ONS and NISRA, Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings, 2019. Data refers to median constituency wage in 2019.  
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Labour, meanwhile, only saw its share of the vote increase in 14 seats and more than 
half (9) were in London or Southern England. Of Labour’s 50 strongest results nearly 
half (22) were in London while many others were in large urban areas with sizeable 
minority ethnic and/or student populations, such as Bradford, Birmingham, 
Manchester and Sheffield. Whereas Labour has been falling back in its traditional and 
working-class territory, over the longer term it has advanced in seats that have larger 
numbers of middle-class professionals, graduates and/or people from minority ethnic 
groups. 
 
The 2019 General Election, therefore, marked a continuation of trends that had been a 
long time in the making, with Labour continuing to poll strongest in the capital, big 
cities, university towns and more ethnically diverse areas while the Conservatives have 
polled stronger in more working-class, northern and less well-educated seats. 
Turnout also fell by a larger margin in Labour-held seats (by -2.6 points) than 
Conservative-held seats (-0.9 points) and declined even more sharply in Labour-held 
seats that had backed Brexit (-3.0 points). This suggests that Labour suffered from a 
turnout problem, especially in seats where large numbers of voters had turned out for 
Brexit.9 
 
3 Poverty, income and the 2019 General Election 
To further explore the general election result we can move past the aggregate-level to 
draw on new individual-level data from the British Election Study (BES) internet 
panel.10 While an online survey is not as methodologically rigorous as face-to-face 
random probability surveys, the estimates of party vote shares were reasonably close 
to the election result. The BES survey is particularly valuable because it contains a 
panel component, whereby the same respondents are interviewed on multiple 
occasions, allowing us to investigate how their voting behaviour and political attitudes 
changed between elections. The survey is also helpful because the questionnaire on 
which it is based probes a wide range of topics, including people’s attitudes toward 
austerity, immigration, Brexit, social and political values, as well as their backgrounds.  
 
Because our main group of interest in this report is people who live on low incomes we 
use a measure of equivalised household income before housing costs, which takes into 
account the total household income and adjusts it for the number of adults living in 
the household and whether or not there are any children living at home.11 We then 
construct income groups based on quintiles, where we define those on low incomes as 
the bottom quintile (the bottom 20%) and those on high incomes as the top quintile 
(the highest 20%). While we are unable to match the most commonly used poverty 
measure in the UK which is based on equivalised net incomes after housing costs (AHC) 
because that is not recorded on the survey, analysis by JRF suggests that around 7 in 
10 individuals in the lowest quintile will be in poverty on this measure, showing there 
is a sizeable overlap of individuals in the lowest quintile here and individuals in 
poverty. 
 
We begin by considering how people on low incomes voted at the 2019 General 
Election, and how this differed from the previous general election in 2017. While these 
two elections were held only two years apart they produced two very different results; 
a hung parliament in 2017 followed by a decisive Conservative majority in 2019. Figure 
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2 uses the panel component of the British Election Study to show how people on low 
and high incomes voted at both these elections.  
 
Figure 2: Flow of low-income voters, 2017 to 2019 
 
If we explore people on low incomes who voted in both general elections then we can 
see how, in 2017, Labour enjoyed a narrow, though historically small, lead. However, 
two years later this lead is turned upside down; in 2019, Labour trailed the 
Conservatives by a striking 15 points. For the first time in recorded history the 
Conservatives outpolled Labour among low-income voters.  
 
Moreover, and remarkably, at the 2019 General Election the Conservative Party was 
more popular among people on low incomes than it was among people on high 
incomes (45% compared with 40%). If we inspect the flow of the vote then we can see 
that the Conservative Party’s extra votes among people on low incomes mostly came 
directly from Labour.  
 
Among people on low incomes who had voted for Labour at the previous election in 
2017, only 68% voted for them two years later. As the left-hand panel of Figure 2 
shows, between 2017 and 2019 Labour’s support among people on low incomes fell by 
nearly 10 percentage points. This suggests that Labour had a specific problem retaining 
the support of low-income voters at the 2019 general election. While Labour lost a 
sizeable chunk of these votes directly to the Conservatives (6 points), they also lost a 
smaller number of low-income voters to the Liberal Democrats (2 points) and other 
assorted parties (2 points). 
 
The Conservatives, in stark contrast, did a much better job of retaining their support 
among these low-income voters; nearly 90% of the low-income voters who had voted 
for them in 2017 also voted for them two years later. This suggests that, in the 
aftermath of the 2016 referendum and the fallout over Brexit, the Conservatives had 
managed to build an increasingly durable relationship with low-income voters. It also 
   
www.jrf.org.uk   11 
suggests that Labour and its new leadership will have to work hard and revive its offer 
if it is to win these voters back. 
 
By contrast, among people on high incomes, the Conservatives lost votes. Most of the 
people on higher incomes who abandoned Boris Johnson and his party defected to the 
Liberal Democrats. The Liberal Democrats increased their share of the vote among 
people on high incomes from 13% to 19%, also gaining votes from Labour. This may 
well help to explain how the Liberal Democrats managed to make gains in affluent 
constituencies such as Richmond. 
 
These changes mean that, at least in terms of electoral politics, the Conservatives can 
no longer be described as the party of the well-off, while Labour is no longer the party 
of those on low incomes. The Conservatives are now more popular among those on 
low incomes than they are among those on high incomes. Labour is now just as 
popular among the very wealthy as it is among those on low incomes. Both parties 
have thus seen major changes in their traditional support base. This reflects how some 
of the founding ‘rules’ of British politics have been overturned. It also points to a more 
general ‘realignment’ of British politics, with low-income voters increasingly drifting 
into a new political home in response to a specific set of concerns – most clearly 
articulated around the issue of Brexit, though not necessarily confined to it.  
 
As these findings suggest, the 2019 general election was also a contest that witnessed 
considerable volatility. Overall, approximately one quarter of all voters switched their 
votes between 2017 and 2019. As Figure 3 shows that about 25% of people on low 
incomes changed the party they voted for, and a similar percentage of people on high 
incomes did so. However, the parties that ‘switchers’ turned to varied considerably 
between different income groups.  
 
Among people on low incomes who switched party, more than 40% backed the 
Conservatives in 2019 having supported other parties in 2017. By contrast, among 
those people on high incomes who switched party, nearly 40% backed the Liberal 
Democrats in 2019 having supported other parties in 2017. Thus, the Conservatives 
won many of their new voters from people on low incomes, whereas the Liberal 
Democrats won many of their new voters from people on higher incomes.  
 
This too points to the wider realignment of British politics, with the Conservative Party 
becoming more dependent on low-income voters for support than it was in the past. 
We thus see a similar story at both the individual level and the aggregate level; the 
Conservatives gained votes among people on low incomes, and in places where 
average earnings were low, but they lost support among people who enjoy higher 
incomes and in seats where average earnings are higher, even if the latter losses were 
not sufficient to hurt the party electorally in terms of losing many seats. 
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Figure 3: Volatility and vote choice at the 2019 General Election 
 
Figure 4 shows the level of support for the main parties among different ‘sub-groups’ 
in British society, including income, education, age and ethnicity. In 2019 people on 
low incomes were significantly more likely to vote Conservative than Labour (45% 
compared with 31%). The Conservatives were also much more popular than Labour 
among people with GCSE-level qualifications or below (59% compared with 22%). This 
educational divide is particularly stark. But it should also not be surprising. As our 
previous report for JRF showed, in 2016 people with few educational qualifications 
were much more likely to support Brexit than people who had higher qualifications. 
And whereas the Conservatives are now more popular among people with GCSE or 
below qualifications than graduates (59% compared with 35%) the reverse is true for 
Labour, which is more popular among graduates than people with fewer educational 
qualifications (35% compared with 22%). 
 
People who are unemployed, however, were more likely to vote Labour than 
Conservative (47% compared with 30%), though there was not much of a difference in 
support for the two parties among those working full-time (35% compared with 37%, 
respectively). There are also clear age divides: people aged 65 years or older were 
much more likely to vote Conservative than Labour (59% compared with 18%) whereas 
younger people aged 18 to 24 years old were much more likely to vote Labour than 
Conservative (55% compared with 18%), although they were also less likely to turn out 
and vote. The Conservatives are also much more popular among White British voters 
than they are among minority ethnic groups (46% compared with 27%). There is not 
much of a gender divide: men are somewhat more likely than women to vote 
Conservative (46% compared with 44%) and women are somewhat more likely than 
men to vote Labour (32% compared with 27%).  
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Figure 4: Party support among different ‘sub-groups’ in society (percentage) 
 
  
The profiles of Conservative and Labour voters thus look remarkably different to the 
past. The Conservative Party in particular has emerged from the 2019 General Election 
with an electorate that is much less economically secure than their traditional voters. 
This is evident both in terms of their voters, who are increasingly drawn from those on 
low incomes and who have few educational qualifications, but also in terms of the sort 
of seats that they now represent.  
 
4 Poverty, income and place 
As we have shown, in 2019 the Conservatives made large gains in constituencies with 
low average wages and made large gains among voters on low household incomes. But 
how did these two factors interact? Did the Conservatives make gains in low-wage 
areas simply because there were more individuals on low incomes who reside there? 
Or was it also something to do with the local economic context? The answers to these 
questions have important implications for debates around the ‘levelling up’ agenda 
and addressing regional inequalities.  
 
First, to get a sense of how evenly distributed across the country Conservative gains 
among low-income voters were spread, Figure 5 shows the estimated level of support 
for the Conservatives in 2019 among low-income voters in different regions of the 
country, and how this compared with 2017 (while controlling for other demographic 
factors). The Conservatives made gains among low-income voters all across the 
country. People on low incomes were particularly likely to back the Conservatives in 
2019 in the West Midlands, East of England, and South East but were least likely to 
support the Conservatives in Scotland and Wales, although even in Wales the 
Conservatives picked up some support. By contrast, the Conservatives tended to lose 
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votes among those on high incomes everywhere, except in the North West where they 
made some minor gains. For the most part, these losses were relatively modest, 
though they were somewhat more pronounced in Scotland, the West Midlands, and 
the Southeast.  
 
Figure 5: Predicted probability of people on low incomes voting Conservative, by 
region 
 
To examine in more detail how the local economic context shapes the voting 
behaviour of people on low incomes, we simultaneously examine the influence on vote 
choice of people’s backgrounds, such as their income, age and gender, as well as the 
characteristics of the area in which they live, such as whether they reside in a 
constituency that has high average earnings.  
 
We first consider support for the Conservative Party. The left-hand panel of Figure 6 
shows how, in 2017, people on high incomes tended to vote Conservative at much the 
same rate regardless of the economic characteristics of where they lived. By contrast, 
people on low incomes were more likely to vote Conservative if they lived in more 
affluent areas. This implies that local economic conditions shaped the voting behaviour 
of people on low incomes much more than they did the behaviour of people on high 
incomes. And when people are on low incomes in an area that also had few high 
paying jobs they were particularly unlikely to vote Conservative. However, as the right-
hand panel of Figure 6 shows, in 2019 the Conservatives made gains across the board 
among people on low incomes while they lost votes among those on high incomes in 
affluent areas. This is part of the reason why the Conservatives were able to make such 
striking gains in Labour heartlands; they increased their share of the vote among low-
income voters who comprise a relatively large share of the electorate in such places, 
without losing support among those on high incomes who stayed loyal to the party. 
But part of the reason why the Conservatives lost votes in more affluent areas is 
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because people on higher incomes in these seats were somewhat less likely to vote for 
them than in 2017, perhaps turning to the Liberal Democrats instead, who were a 
more competitive alternative in such places. 
 




The picture for the Labour Party, meanwhile, is even starker. As Figure 7 shows, in 
2017 Labour enjoyed substantial support among people on low incomes in places with 
low average earnings. However, just two years later in 2019, their support among low-
income voters in low-wage seats dropped significantly. For example, in a place with a 
median weekly wage of £500 for a full-time employee (one standard deviation below 
the national average), Labour received 48% of the vote among those on low incomes in 
2017. However, in 2019 it was just 37%, a drop of 11 points. This put them behind the 
Conservatives in many low-wage areas. 
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Figure 7: Income, median wage in constituency and Labour vote 2017 and 2019 
 
These findings reveal that there is a complex relationship between regional wage 
inequalities and individual-level income inequalities on voter choice. The Conservatives 
made large gains in seats in areas with low wages, and these gains came primarily from 
people on low incomes. It was thus people on low incomes in low-wage areas that 
spearheaded Boris Johnson and the Conservative Party to their clear victory over 
Labour. The Conservatives not only went deep into Labour’s heartlands, but did so by 
appealing to Labour’s formerly loyal voters. For Labour, this represented a double loss. 
Labour not only lost its heartlands but did so because its once core voters abandoned 
them for their direct rival. This illustrates the scale of the challenge that faces Labour if 
it wants to win back support and retake these sorts of seats. 
 
5 Brexit and redistribution: low-income voters in 
modern Britain 
What explains these dramatic shifts? In our earlier report on the 2017 General Election 
we showed how low-income voters in modern Britain were being pulled in different 
directions (or were ‘cross-pressured’); while they were attracted to Labour because of 
economic reasons, like wanting to curb inequality, they were also attracted to the 
Conservatives for identity and cultural reasons, such as delivering on Brexit and 
wanting to reform immigration. To what extent can changes in support for Labour and 
the Conservatives be explained by this tension?  
 
To answer this question, we can examine responses to two important survey 
questions. The first taps into ‘left versus right’ economic issues and preferences for 
redistribution (that is whether incomes should be made more equal or not). The 
second taps into cultural issues like Britain’s relationship with the European Union 
(whether Britain should unite fully with the EU or not).12 We first examine what voters 
   
www.jrf.org.uk   17 
thought about each issue. We then examine where voters thought each of the two 
main parties stood on each issue. 
 
Figure 8 shows how low-income voters are pulled in different directions. From the 
distribution of responses we can see that while they lean left on economic issues, 
favouring greater economic redistribution, they lean right on cultural issues, favouring 
greater independence from Europe. From a demand-side point of view this reveals 
how there is a large amount of support among people on low incomes for a party that 
is economically on the left, promising to tackle economic injustice and inequality, but 
which is also pro-Brexit, promising to honour the result of the referendum and reform 
immigration.  
 
However, from a supply-side point of view there was, until recently, no ready-made 
party that clearly represented this value space, although the nascent Brexit Party did 
briefly try to occupy it. By contrast, high-income voters are much more centrist on 
economic issues, and much more pro-European on cultural issues. From a demand-
side point of view, there is thus a large constituency among high-income voters who 
would be drawn to an economically centrist, pro-European party. From a supply-side 
point of view, the Liberal Democrats would seem well-placed to capture these votes 
(which as we saw earlier to a certain extent they did). But the appeal of the Liberal 
Democrats as a viable option is perhaps hampered by the first-past-the-post system, 
which renders them uncompetitive in many seats. 
 




Notes: The EU integration scale runs from 0 ‘Unite fully with the European Union’ to 10 ‘Protect our Independence’. The 
Redistribution scale runs from 0 ‘Government should try to make incomes equal’ to 10 ‘Government should be less concerned 
about equal incomes’. 
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In 2017, Labour’s ‘fudge’ on Brexit meant that many low-income voters stayed with 
the party and supported it for economic reasons (Goodwin and Heath, 2017; Vaccari et 
al, 2020).13 But how did people on low incomes view the two main parties in 2019? 
Figure 9 shows that people on low incomes clearly saw Labour as a pro-European 
party. It was thus regarded as far more pro-European than where low-income voters 
placed themselves. Labour was also viewed by people on low incomes as being very 
left-wing (even more left-wing than where the voters placed themselves). And so even 
if low-income voters may have been attracted to Labour on matters of economic 
redistribution, they were in stark opposition to what they saw as Labour’s anti-Brexit 
position. By contrast, people on low incomes saw the Conservatives as clearly pro-
Brexit, and as being closer to their own position on European issues, even if they still 
regarded the party as being to the right on economic issues. 
 
Figure 9: Perception of party positions among low-income voters, kernel density plot 
 
Notes: The perceived party position on the EU integration scale runs from 0 ‘Unite fully with the European Union’ to 10 ‘Protect our 
Independence’. The perceived party position on the Redistribution scale runs from 0 ‘Government should try to make incomes 
equal’ to 10 ‘Government should be less concerned about equal incomes’. 
To a certain extent, therefore, low-income voters were therefore still pulled in 
different directions by the two main parties in 2019. They faced a choice between a 
very left-wing Labour Party that favoured Europe and a very right-wing Conservative 
Party that supported Brexit. But whereas in 2017 these push-and-pull factors were 
softened by Labour’s muted support for a soft Brexit, two years later, in 2019, Labour’s 
more pro-Remain position may have pushed low-income voters away. 
 
To illustrate how low-income voters’ views of the main parties’ positions on Europe 
changed between elections, Figure 10 shows how pro-European they thought each 
party was in 2017 and 2019. We can see how low-income voters thought that both 
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parties had shifted their positions. On one hand, in 2019, Labour was seen as being 
more pro-European than it had been in 2017, which may have pushed low-income 
voters away from the party. On the other hand, the Conservatives were seen as more 
pro-Brexit, which may have helped to attract people on low incomes. 
 
Figure 10: Perception of party positions on EU issues among low-income voters, 
kernel density plot 
 
Notes: The perceived party position on the EU integration scale runs from 0 ‘Unite fully with the European Union’ to 10 ‘Protect our 
independence’.  
To explore these issues even further we can also investigate how attitudes towards 
Europe shaped people’s voting behaviour between 2017 and 2019, and how they are 
related to changes in party support. In doing so, we focus on three groups of voters:  
• People who consistently supported the Conservatives in 2017 and 2019 (stable 
Conservatives).  
• People who voted for the Conservatives in 2017 but then voted for a different 
party in 2019 (Conservative lost).  
• People who voted for another party in 2017 but then switched over to Boris 
Johnson and the Conservatives in 2019 (Conservative gained).  
 
Overall, among people who voted at both the 2017 and 2019 general elections, 34% 
voted for the Conservatives in 2017 and 2019; 11% voted for other parties in 2017 and 
then for the Conservatives in 2019; and 6% voted for the Conservatives in 2017 and 
then other parties in 2019. The remaining 49% voted for other parties in both elections 
(though not necessarily the same one on each occasion).  
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By contrast, among people that voted in both elections, 24% voted for Labour in 2017 
and 2019; 6% voted for other parties in 2017 and for Labour in 2019; and 10% voted 
for Labour in 2017 and other parties in 2019. The remaining 61%14 voted for other 
parties in both elections (though again, not necessarily the same one on each 
occasion). 
 
Figure 11 illustrates how this pattern of vote gains and losses for the Conservatives 
varied according to people’s view on Europe. In 2019, the Conservatives were much 
more likely to pick up support from voters who supported Brexit, and somewhat more 
likely to lose votes among those who backed Remain. However, their success in 
consolidating Brexit voters outweighed their losses among Remain supporters. This 
further helps to explain how and why the Conservative Party was able to attract such a 
strong level of support at the 2019 general election. 
 
Figure 11: Conservative vote gains and losses, 2017–2019 
 
 
Notes: the EU Integration scale runs from 0 ‘Unite fully with the European Union’ to 10 ‘Protect our independence’. 
 
6 Conclusions 
British politics remains in a state of flux. The vote for Brexit and the two general 
elections that followed have produced seismic political change. As we have shown in 
this report, a realignment of British politics is now underway. 
 
The Conservative Party has made its strongest gains among people on low incomes, 
those who are at risk of poverty and who often live in communities that suffer from 
low average incomes. The Conservative Party is no longer exclusively the ‘party of the 
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rich’. For the first time in recorded history, it now holds a clear lead over Labour 
among people who are struggling to make ends meet. 
 
In previous reports for JRF, we showed why these low-income voters had become ‘up-
for-grabs’, revealing how many were ‘cross-pressured’ by their strong desire for 
greater economic redistribution but also support for leaving the European Union. This 
was an outlook that did not fit neatly onto the existing political map. In this report, we 
have shown how Conservatives became the main beneficiary of this tension. Their call 
to ‘level-up’ the nation and redistribute resources away from London to the regions, 
combined with a clear line on support for Brexit, appealed strongly to voters who had 
traditionally aligned themselves with Labour. 
 
The Labour Party’s drift, under Jeremy Corbyn, to a stronger pro-Remain position, 
while holding the line on economic redistribution, has weakened its relationship with 
low-income voters. Against this backdrop, Labour lost its historic lead among low-
income voters. The new leadership team around Sir Keir Starmer would do well to 
explore ways of reconnecting with these voters, not only through economic policies 
but also through measures that tap into their concerns about Britain’s place in the 
world, immigration, law and order and rapid social change. 
 
Looking to the future, it also seems likely that these voters will remain up for grabs as 
further flux sweeps through British politics. At the time of writing, low-income voters 
are being hit the hardest by the outbreak of yet another crisis: COVID-19. Unlike the 
post-2008 Great Recession that cut across economics and politics, the outbreak of 
COVID-19 and the lockdown presents a crisis that cuts across three dimensions: 
politics, economics and health.  
 
Research by JRF has already demonstrated that many of the industries with the highest 
levels of furloughed workers are those that have high proportions of workers on low 
incomes, while the Office for National Statistics estimates that among the working-age 
population it is ‘elementary workers’ who are most at risk of dying from the virus. 
 
This crisis, therefore, looks set to exacerbate some of the underlying social divides that 
we have pointed to in this and our previous reports. In the early stages of the 
lockdown self-isolation was largely compulsory. But over time it will become voluntary, 
and then an economic luxury. Different social groups will continue to have 
fundamentally different experiences of this crisis, and that may yet have profound 
political consequences. It is low-income workers, who have been central to driving 
recent political change in the country, who are on the frontline of this crisis. Labour, 
the Conservatives and all our political parties thus have good reason to keep the focus 
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10 All British Election Study (BES) data is available at: www.britishelectionstudy.com. 
We thank the British Election Study team for organising and compiling the data. 
 
11 We adopt the modified OECD equivalence weights, which are rescaled to a couple 
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12 The exact question wordings are: Some people feel that government should make 
much greater efforts to make people’s incomes more equal. Other people feel that 
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‘Government should try to make incomes equal’ and 10 is ‘Government should be less 
concerned about equal incomes’). 
 
Some people feel that Britain should do all it can to unite fully with the European 
Union. Other people feel that Britain should do all it can to protect its independence 
from the European Union. Where would you place yourself on this scale? And where 
would you place the political parties on this scale? (Where 0 is ‘Unite fully with the 
European Union’ and 10 is ‘Protect our independence’). 
 
13 Vaccari, C. Smets, K. and Heath, O. (2020) ‘The United Kingdom 2017 election: 
polarisation in a split issue space’, West European Politics, Vol. 43, No. 3, pp. 587–609. 
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